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A number of methods currently exist or are being developed to deter-
mine where Internet users are located geographically when they access
a particular webpage. Yet regardless of the precautions taken by web-
site operators to limit the locations from which they allow access, it is
likely that users will find ways to gain access to restricted content.
Should the evasion of geolocation constitute circumvention of access
controls so that § 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA ") applies? Because location data can properly be considered
personally identifiable information ("PH"), this Note argues that
§ 1201 should not apply absent a warning that such data is being col-
lected by the website operator. One interpretation of the anticircum-
vention rules requires no violation of the rights granted to the
copyright holder by 17 U.S.C. § 106. A better interpretation, however,
would require some violation of those rights and would also allow the
evasion of geolocation when streaming online content. This Note seeks
to explore the existing legalframework within the technological context
and to propose solutions which balance the needs of users against
those of the website operators and copyright holders.
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INTRODUCTION
Both seasons of the recently popular British television show Sherlock
aired in the United Kingdom on the BBC several months before they aired in
the United States on PBS.1 The seasons aired in the U.S. in a slightly edited
form; the unedited versions were unavailable to U.S. viewers until they were
released on DVD and made accessible via streaming on sites such as Netflix.
Not so long ago, waiting would have been the only option for the likely
small number of viewers who even knew of the show's airing. The Internet
has changed this simple fact. Now, any interested person can hear about the
episode in minute detail as it airs even if they cannot watch it.2 After Sher-
lock's broadcasts in the U.K., the BBC made the full episodes available via
streaming only for viewers located in the U.K. The first episode of season
two even broke the record for total visits from Internet users purportedly in
the U.K. the day after it originally aired.3 It is possible, though not certain,
that some of these viewers were located outside of the U.K. As will be dis-
cussed in Part I.C of this Note, it is relatively easy to convince any website
1. For example, episode one of season two first aired on BBC One in the U.K. on
January 1, 2012, while the same episode first aired on PBS in the U.S. on May 6, 2012, a full
four months later. BBC One - Sherlock - Episode Guide, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/pro
grammes/bO18ttws/episodes/guide#pOOm5wm7 (last visited Dec. 29, 2012); Sherlock, MAS-
tERPIEcE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/masterpiece/sherlock/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2012).
2. See, e.g., Brian Mansfield, 'American Idol' Baton Rouge: the Live Blog, USA To-
DAY (Jan. 24, 2013, 9:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/idolchatter/2013/01/24/ameri
can-idol-baton-rouge-live-blog/1863097/ (liveblogging a recent episode of American Idol);
doctor who liveblog - Tumblr, TuMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/doctor+who+liveblog
(last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (archiving user-submitted posts with tag "doctor who liveblog,"
which generally contain responses, quotes, or other content direct from fans actively watching
episodes of BBC's Doctor Who).
3. Stuart Miles, Sherlock Sets New Record for BBC iPlayer, PocKur-LIN (Jan. 8,
2012, 11:44 AM), http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/43756/bbc-iplayer-record-new-year-
figures.
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that a user in the U.S. is located in the U.K. The issue is whether doing so
violates copyright law.
The Internet has allowed the world to become increasingly more con-
nected. Though physical borders-and sometimes difficult to surmount digi-
tal borders-still exist, the reality is that most things can be obtained online.
One side effect of this increased connection is the fact that it is now possible
to access copyrighted content that has been placed on the Internet from any-
where in the world, even if that content would not normally be accessible
from the user's location. Some of this content is accessed in definitely legal
manners-for example, through sites with licenses to make the content
available from the copyright holder or sites where the copyright holder has
made the content available with minimal restrictions. Other modes of access
constitute clear violations of U.S. copyright law, such as when users upload
content they do not own, without permission, and make it available for
streaming or download.4 But not all cases are as clean cut. This Note exam-
ines one such case. Website operators may provide legally accessible
streaming content to users from one location but prevent access by users in
others through the use of geolocation tools. A user can, however, convince
the geolocation tool employed by the website operator that they are acces-
sing from an authorized location when in fact they are connecting from an
unauthorized one.
This Note focuses on U.S. copyright law in answering the question of
the potential copyright liability for evading geolocation and in providing a
potential solution to the problem of geolocation evasion. Part I discusses
how websites can determine the location of their users and how those users
can convince the website that they are in fact in an authorized location, with
particular focus on Internet protocol ("IP") geolocation. Part II examines the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") and, specifically, the anticir-
cumvention rules in § 1201, considering the approaches taken by circuit
courts in anticircumvention cases. Part III suggests a permissive approach to
evasion in this context and advocates for licensing agreements as a possible
answer to the riddle of evasion of geolocation online for the purpose of ac-
cessing a geographically limited, but otherwise legal, stream.
4. For the purposes of this Note, the question of who is properly liable in such cases of
clear violations will not be addressed. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that there was insufficient proof of control to find vicari-
ous liability on the part of Google for copyright secondary infringement); CoStar Grp., Inc. v.
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) (analogizing the role of an internet service
provider to that of a telephone common carrier as a mere transmitter of information); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (holding that the online bulletin board service operator did not commit direct infringe-
ment when users uploaded infringing copies).
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I. INTERNET TERRITORIALITY, GEOLOCATION, AND EVASION
A. Bordered or Borderless: Territoriality on the Internet
The early days of the development of the Internet came with a belief that
"cyberspace might challenge the authority of nation-states and move to a
new, post-territorial system."' But the Internet is no longer a truly borderless
means of communication. Instead, it has developed borders similar to those
found in the physical world.6 This shift comes in part from the advent of
geolocation technologies that make it possible to determine, to a certain
level of precision and reliability, the location from which an individual user
has accessed the site in question.
A truly borderless cyberspace as envisioned through much of the 1990s
embraces a libertarian ideal of a world where the real-space government is
incapable of asserting control over life online.7 As Lawrence Lessig noted,
"The claim for cyberspace was not just that government would not regulate
cyberspace-it was that government could not regulate cyberspace. Cyber-
space was, by nature, unavoidably free."8 Despite vocal advocates for the
lack of territoriality, it did not last.
Cyberlaw has shifted to the regulation of technology by governments.9
The focus of cyberlaw is on the endpoints of the network where users access
digital content.' 0 As a result, the Internet is no longer a borderless libertarian
paradise. Instead, the laws that regulate the online world have become
borderless in that they may be applied to people accessing the Internet re-
gardless of their physical location." Much of the impetus for this change can
likely be laid at the feet of businesses unwilling to discard old geographi-
cally based business models.12 In order to perpetuate these business models,
companies quickly developed methods of online geolocation in order to de-
termine where individuals were accessing their content from, even if they
could not determine who was accessing it." These business interests often
5. JACK GoiLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERN?: I LLUSION OF A
BORDERLEss WoRLD 14 (2006).
6. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, "Imagine There's No Countries": Geo-Identification, the
Law, and the Not-So-Borderless Internet, 10 J. INTERNirT L. 17, 20 (2007).
7. Lawrence Lessig, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 3 (2006) ("Even at Yale-not known for
libertarian passions-the students seemed drunk on what James Boyle would later call the
'libertarian gotcha': no government could survive without the Internet's riches, yet no govern-
ment could control the life that went on there.").
8. Id.
9. Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. Riv. 323, 348 (2003) ("If version 1.0 of
cyberlaw was characterized by the power of technology to regulate, a defining feature of
cyberlaw 2.0 is the government regulation of technology.").
10. Id.
I1. Id. at 332.
12. Id.
13. Id. ("[S]everal companies are rapidly creating new tools that allow for effective
(though imperfect) geographic identification on the Internet.").
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align with the interests of governments in regulation online. As Geist posits,
since "both business and government share a vested interest in bringing geo-
graphic borders to the online environment (albeit for different reasons), it
should come as little surprise that technologies facilitating geographic identi-
fication have so quickly arrived onto the marketplace."l 4 Regardless of the
reasons for which these tools were initially developed, they allowed govern-
ments to engage in varying levels of online enforcement which, in turn,
made the lack of borders on the Internet significantly less appealing.' 5 Many
of the current borders on the Internet exist either because of website opera-
tors acting in response to business interests or government regulation.'6
Other online borders, such as those created at the Internet Service Provider
("ISP") or hardware level, prevent any access to significant online content
and are often controversial.' 7 This Note will focus upon those methods that
rely on determining the user's physical location, rather than those that focus
on the ISP or hardware level.
B. Types of Geolocation Tools
It is clear that geolocation tools are creating borders within the once
borderless Internet. There are a number of ways to achieve this goal of locat-
ing the user. Current methods include simply asking a user to report their
information, looking at the IP address provided to locate users, and using
timing-based techniques."' Development in geolocation is driven by a num-
ber of factors, though targeted advertising is perhaps the most lucrative.19
Geolocation, however, is not simply used relatively benignly for targeting
advertisements or for web analytics; instead, it is also used to pursue legal
action in a number of contexts, including copyright infringement.201
14. Id. at 333.
15. See Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion
of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & EN'r. L.J. 567, 581 (2012) ("Once gov-
ernments began to engage in de facto global enforcement on the Internet, the borderlessness of
the network no longer appeared to be an advantage, and the desirability of borders began to be
re-evaluated.").
16. See id.
17. See id. at 583 (discussing filtering methods which rely upon content filtering either
at the hardware or ISP level). These methods are generally controversial and, in the later case,
are used by the more oppressive regimes in today's world. There are arguments that these
methods are also in violation of the First Amendment in the United States and the European
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union.
18. See James A. Muir & Paul C. Van Oorschot, Internet Geolocation: Evasion and
Counterevasion, ACM COMPUTING SuRvivs, Dec. 2009, at 4:1 (discussing means of geoloca-
tion, with primary emphasis on IP geolocation).
19. Id. at 2. Advertisers will often want to target their online advertisements to the
user's location. For example, a local business may only want their advertisements to be served
to users within their immediate area, or national retailers may want to include the local address
on their advertisements.
20. See id. (discussing reasons why a user may choose to evade geolocation online).
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1. The Self-Reporting Method of Geolocation
The first type of geolocation, based purely on self-reporting, is the most
basic means of locating a user online. 2 1 While useful for advertising or pro-
viding custom content, this method is not particularly valuable as a tool for
enforcement.2 2 Users can easily falsify their location simply by choosing
another option. Or, if the website stores a cookie on the user's computer to
save the originally provided location, future relocation of the computer may
not be captured. These tools therefore have limited usefulness in the copy-
right context. These methods are somewhat more reliable than typical self-
reporting but are still unlikely to be useful for enforcement purposes. 23 This
Note will thus focus primarily on the second type of geolocation, IP
geolocation.
2. IP Geolocation
IP geolocation provides a greater degree of reliability than the self-re-
porting method. Increasing in popularity, IP geolocation is even used by
companies such as Google, who automatically redirect traffic based on client
IP.24 This method is particularly powerful because the IP address can often
be traced to reveal either the individual user or at least the exact machine
used to access the Internet." 25 IP addresses are numeric strings tied to a com-
puter or other device accessing the Internet; they have been likened to real-
world mailing addresses. 2 6 Because the IP address is tied to the device, it is
capable of providing some information as to the access location. Yet many
current IP addresses are not permanently assigned to a particular device;
they are instead assigned on a dynamic, temporary basis. 27 As a result, the
same IP address may point to completely different devices depending on
when that address is logged. This issue arises because the number of ad-
dresses available under IPv4, the currently prevailing IP, has been ex-
hausted.28 This means that determining the access point is a somewhat more
21. See Trimble, supra note 15, at 592.
22. See id. at 593.
23. See id.
24. Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 18, at 4:2.
25. Joshua J. McIntyre, Comment, Balancing Expectations of Online Privacy: Why In-
ternet Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information, 60
DEPAUi L. Rvv. 895, 897 (2011).
26. Id. at 899-900 ("An IP address is a string of four numbers, each ranging from 0 to
255, that serves as a unique identifier to facilitate online communications. An IP address is tied
to a computer, not its user, and will ordinarily not change when a new user logs in. In this way,
an IP address is analogues to a physical mailing address, which is required for the sending and
receiving of postal mail.").
27. See Trimble, supra note 15, at 594.
28. See id. at 595. The launch of IPv6 will increase the available number of addresses,
alleviating this particular problem. The shift from IPv4 to IPv6 skips IPv5 because IPv5 was
used to indicate the second iteration of Internet Stream ("ST") Protocol, which initially was
thought to be the replacement of the IP system. Ultimately, however, the ST approach did not
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complicated process, though the ISP that assigned the address can determine
to which account that address was assigned. 29
Some of the information provided by IP addresses is intentionally re-
corded in databases by the entity which has registered the address (typically
an ISP or other organization).3" The information in these databases is often
provided as contact details for the registrant. 31 It can be accessed through
using various identifiers in publicly accessible databases, all of which pro-
vide varying degrees of precision and accuracy.) 2 In order to find most of the
information provided by the registrant, a website operator can run a "whois"
lookup" on the IP address itself, the autonomous system ("AS") numbers, or
the domain name associated with the address.3 4 Just as every device will
have an IP address when it connects to the Internet, every IP address is
associated with an AS number, which is a unique 16-bit integer used for
routing.3 The information provided from the IP address lookup typically
includes contact information provided, at least in part, to help users deal
with network problems.3 6 Similarly, the location information gathered by
looking up the AS number provides the point of contact for the registrant of
that number.)7 Finally, domain name lookups use the DNS database to pro-
vide information for the registrant of the domain name.38 Absent some act of
evasiveness by the user or registered entity (either through falsifying the
provided information or intentionally obscuring the correct IP address), this
information is generally reliable. Yet even without an intentional act of eva-
sion, these data points are not perfect. Most notably, all of the information
accessed here will usually point to an organization or ISP. This means that
the entity identified in the lookup's address may not be the same, or even
close to, the location of the target host.39 For example, a lookup of the IP
take hold and lPv5 was never deployed. Brian Robinson, What Ever Happened to IPv5?, FCW
(July 31, 2006), http://fcw.com/articles/2006/07/31/what-ever-happened-to-ipv5.aspx.
29. Id. ("[O]nly Internet service providers know at any given moment which dynami-
cally assigned IP addresses are assigned to which users.").
30. Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 18, at 4:4.
31. Id. at 4:4.
32. Id. at 4:4-7.
33. A "whois" lookup accesses a public database that provides information that con-
nects various Internet identifiers with the real-world entity that is registered to that identifier.
34. Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 18, at 4:4-6. Though a "whois" can always be
run on the IP address provided or the AS numbers, not all IPs will be associated with a domain
name. But since domain names must also be registered, a lookup on the domain name, where
available, can provide useful information.
35. Id. at 4:4-5.
36. Id. at 4:4.
37. Id. at 4:5.
38. Id. The DNS database stores data pertaining to registered domain names. This infor-
mation includes the reported address of the registrant.
39. See id.
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address of a user located in Ottawa may reasonably return an address in
Toronto, 450 kilometers from the user's actual location.40
Lookup by AS number poses similar problems, as some locations indi-
cated by certain AS numbers may have an astronomically smaller population
than that indicated by the batch of IP addresses associated with the AS num-
ber.4 1 The domain name lookups are similarly unreliable because some large
Internet hosts may map only to a single location. 42 The registrant may also
have voluntarily provided information in the DNS LOC records. 43 Where
provided, this information is likely to be more geographically precise than
other means, as it provides "latitude, longitude, altitude, size, horizontal pre-
cision and vertical precision" which, particularly with regards to the latitude
and longitude, can be used to directly map the host location.44 The informa-
tion provided could still be falsified or misleading. 45 The advantage of all
these approaches is that coding in a "whois" lookup on any or all of these
factors is relatively simple and can quickly provide at least semi-reliable
information to the website operator.
Not all of the information that comes with an IP address is necessarily
provided by the registrant, however. Other data may be collected less di-
rectly, such as in the context of geographically limited domain names. Be-
cause the domain name-registrant chooses to use a geographically limited or
associated domain name, geographically limited domain names share simi-
larities with the previously discussed registrant-provided information availa-
ble within a "whois" lookup of the domain name.46 Many of the current top-
level domain names ("TLDs") are country-level domains, meaning that the
40. Id. at 4:4 ("[O]ne author's IP address in Ottawa falls in the address block 70.24.0.0/
13. ARIN lists the registrant for this block as Rogers Cable Inc. (ROCA), One Mount Pleasant,
Toronto, Ontario, M4Y 2Y5, Canada. So this technique would geolocate the author's PC (with
very poor precision) to Toronto, 450 km from its true Ottawa location (albeit, still with correct
country-level resolution)."). ARIN stands for the American Registry for Internet Numbers, a
Regional Internet Registry. It coordinates and manages the region's Internet number resources.
ARIN's region includes Canada, many of the Caribbean and North Atlantic islands, and the
United States. ARIN at a Glance, AM. REGISTRY FOR INTFRNir Nos., https://www.arin.net/
aboutus/overview.html (last viewed Mar. 7, 2013).
41. Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 18, at 4:5 (discussing AS 1239, which indicates
Reston, Virginia with a population under 100,000 and 2,883,584 associated IP addresses).
42. Id. at 4:6 (noting that all hosts with the aol.com domain name map to Dulles,
Virginia).
43. Id. (discussing the public DNS database but noting that very few hosts have these
records). A DNS LOC record provides quite detailed location information for a given domain
name.
44. Id. The DNS LOC record provides exact coordinates as provided by the registrant.
Though this information can be left out or potentially falsified, where available it is signifi-
cantly more precise than similar information available in other locations.
45. Id. at 4:7.
46. Id. at 4:7-8 (discussing geographic codes within domain names).
468
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last two letters of the domain name often indicate the country of origin.47 But
even where the domain name-registrant must retain some connection to the
indicated country, the registrant's computers may very well be placed else-
where. 48 Further, not all country code TLDs actually require association with
the indicated country.49 Finally, some countries are simply too large for this
form of identification to prove particularly useful."
Still other information is available when pairing the unreliable user-pro-
vided information discussed above with data provided by an application
used for Internet access and an associated IP address.' User-provided infor-
mation may be rendered somewhat more reliable if it can be associated with
the same IP address over time.52 Application-provided data is somewhat dif-
ferent. Web browser HTTP headers, for example, often include information
that can at least somewhat reasonably be inferred to indicate location.-" A
website operator could also use code to request data such as time of day,
which will at the very least provide information as to the user's time zone.54
Though this information is not always available and can potentially be falsi-
fied, when paired with an IP address it can provide at least some data as to
the location of a user.
3. Time- and Distance-Based Techniques for Geolocation
Measuring the time it takes to get a reply from the host or examining the
path it takes to get to the host provide slightly more technical methods of
estimating location.5 1 It is possible for the website operator to determine the
time it takes to send a message to and receive a reply from the host using the
47. Id. at 4:7 (discussing the association between a country code TLD and the country
indicated). These TLDs have a variety of rules depending on the managing organization and
may or may not require the registrant to have some form of presence in the indicated country.
For example, Canada maintains geographic requirements for registrants of ca domain names
while the .md domain names, technically for the Republic of Moldova, are marketed to the
healthcare industry.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 4:7-8 (giving the example of the .md TLD, which indicates the Republic of
Moldova but is marketed to, and used by, the healthcare industry worldwide).
50. Id. at 4:7. In the copyright context, however, if the country indicated by the TLD
were reliable as to the location of the computer (which, as discussed above, is not necessarily
the case), geolocation even on such an imprecise scale may be sufficient. If the main concern
is whether the website operator is in compliance with the copyright laws of a given country or
only providing content in a manner permissible under a licensing agreement, the country is
likely to be the most important detail.
51. Id. at 4:8.
52. Unfortunately, at least for the proponents of online geolocation, dynamically as-
signed IP addresses make this less likely.
53. Id. at 4:8 (noting that "en-GB" in a "User-Agent" string may lead a server to deter-
mine that the user is English, from Great Britain).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 4:8- 10.
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common command line tool "ping."5 6 This information can be analyzed and
used with a relatively high level of precision, at least where the host is con-
figured to respond to such a request.5 7 But this method has a major draw-
back. Repeated requests may be viewed as an attack on the host since they
create a heavy load on the server, and beyond a certain level they could
prevent other access or cause the server to crash." In addition, the tests that
have been conducted mostly involve well-connected hosts, and thus the level
of precision may be significantly lessened in other contexts.59
The remaining method involves drawing inferences based on looking at
what other hosts are "near" the target host.6 0 This essentially involves tracing
the route taken to reach the target host and examining the IP addresses or
domains of the hosts nearest in the chain to the target for location informa-
tion.6' While results of such a trace may provide information about a host
relatively near the target, this is no guarantee of the actual physical distance
between the located host and the target.62 As with all other IP geolocation
methods, each of these has its drawbacks and is far from perfect.
C. Evasion of Geolocation
Part I.B discusses a number of problems with the various approaches to
IP geolocation, including falsification of information. Beyond those limita-
tions, users may also take steps to intentionally disguise or alter their IP
address to avoid detection. Not all reasons for evasion are inherently objec-
tionable. Some users may be particularly interested in privacy, for exam-
ple.6 3 Or perhaps a user who grew up in England may simply prefer to view
the British version of the BBC news homepage rather than the American
56. Id. at 4:8. The command line is a method of issuing commands to a computer which
uses a text interface rather than a graphical one. It often allows for more fine-grained control
of the computer than a graphical interface would. The "ping" command line tool sends a
request to a server and displays a reply that shows the route the message travelled between the
remote server and the requesting computer.
57. Id. at 4:8-9 (discussing the accuracy of specific methods for using the time to deter-
mine location but noting that, increasingly, hosts are configured to not respond to these re-
quests). These methods involve determining the (estimated) absolute minimum round-trip time
for the message to be sent and a response received between the requesting server and the user's
machine. If this time can be determined, then actual distance and location can be calculated.
58. Id. at 4:9 (noting that it is possible to space out the ping requests to avoid this, but
doing so greatly limits the real-time usefulness of the method). The server is unlikely to crash
when the requests are sent purely to locate individual users accessing the website in a normal
manner. The risk of malicious users attacking sites through repeated requests has led server
operators to block these requests. In addition, a poorly coded request could potentially loop
and cause a similar problem.
59. Id. at 4:9 (noting specifically that dialup or satellite connections may be
problematic).
60. Id. at 4:10.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 4:2.
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one. If, however, the evasion allows access to content protected under copy-
right that would otherwise be inaccessible, then the act may be objectionable
under copyright law. Also interestingly, many so-called evasion techniques
closely resemble the generally unobjectionable telecommuting practices of
business travelers or employees."4
Some effective evasion methods are not generally thought of as forms of
evasion. Perhaps the simplest evasion technique is one that should be famil-
iar to any business traveler who worked in the hey-day of dialup Internet:
dialing long distance to access an ISP.6 This method is slow and expensive
in today's world of high-speed Internet but will almost always be available. 66
In addition, there are services which allow users to remotely access a com-
puter, often a computer owned by the user, located anywhere in the world. If
the user then accesses the Internet using this computer, that computer's IP
address attaches to their activities.67 This form of remote access typically
requires the user or the user's family or friends to own a computer located in
the desired geographical location.68 A number of remote desktop applica-
tions allow use of a remote machine almost as if that machine were sitting
directly in front of the user.69
There are also techniques with a bit less in common with traditional
Internet access methods. One such method is the use of a proxy.',' A proxy
sits between the client and the server being accessed and will usually run on
an entirely different host from either; essentially, it is a remote host that the
client accesses from their host and then uses to access other places online as
if they were located at the remote host.7 I There are a variety of proxy ser-
vices, the simplest of which are the easiest for concerned websites to block.72
These are simple webpages on which a user enters the address of the website
they wish to access, receiving the requested site within the browser's frame
in response.73 Because website operators can determine the IP addresses
used by this sort of proxy, they can generally prevent access through this
method if they desire.74 Yet these are not the only forms of proxy service.
There are also a number of subscription services, either specialized by coun-
64. See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
65. Trimble, supra note 15, at 601.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 600-01 (identifying LogeMeln and GoToMyPC as examples).
68. See id. at 601 (describing this method as "self-sustained" cybertravel).
69. See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 18, at 4:14.
70. See id. at 4:13-14 (discussing use of proxies).
71. Id.
72. See Trimble, supra note 15, at 602.
73. Id.
74. Id. These proxies are identifiable because the requests will come from certain IP
addresses that are available to the proxy service. As a result, website operators can simply
block the IPs known to be used by the service.
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try or covering larger regions, which provide proxy access to paying users. 75
These services provide a range of benefits to the user who wants to evade
geolocation, from increased privacy to the ability to access blocked con-
tent.76 The Tor project, provided for free to users, is likely the most signifi-
cant proxy service. It "utilizes a series of proxies," and political activists,
whistleblowers, and intelligence gatherers use it heavily. 7 Notably, the U.S.
government generously funds this particular project.78 Similar in a technical
sense, using SSH, or Secured Shell, to access a remote machine and then
accessing the Internet from that machine also constitutes using a proxy. This
method is not as useful as Tor, however, because the user or someone con-
nected to them generally must have control over the machine being used and
access is only text based.7 9
Even as geolocation tools become more accurate, users will continue to
find ways to evade these measures. 0 There are options for website operators
that may be useful in locating users even where the user hides their host IP,
but as with the IP geolocation tools, these are imperfect and lack precision."'
It seems possible that other means may supplant IP geolocation as the pri-
mary method of determining the location of users in the future, but it is
substantially more likely that new techniques will be developed to evade the
use of those tools. 82
As will be discussed further in Part III.C, geolocation tools are useful to
copyright holders and website operators in the licensing context. Ultimately,
despite the possibility of evasion, a reasonably reliable geolocation tool
serves as a valuable method of "effective regulation and enforcement on the
Internet" and can aid business entities looking to divide markets and grant
licensing rights in one country while withholding them in another.83 From
the business perspective, not all groups interested in licensing content may
be able to pay for a world-wide license.8 4 As a result, market segmentation
makes licensing opportunities available to a wider range of licensees." In
75. See id. at 602-03 (mentioning Anonymizer and My Expat Network as examples).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 603-04.
78. Id. at 603.
79. Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 18, at 14 ("Anyone with ssh access to a remote
machine (e.g. anon.machine.example) can, through port forwarding, use this machine as a
SOCKS proxy to browse the web through.").
80. See Trimble, supra note 15, at 604 ("As one might expect, this is a constant race
where it may take just a few weeks or months for the creators of evasion techniques to respond
to improvements in geolocation tools and improve their techniques to further challenge
geolocation.").
81. See id.
82. See id. at 605 (mentioning GPS location information as a possible substitute).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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addition, the copyright holder is able to maximize their profits by choosing
the most beneficial licensing arrangements.16
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Copyright Territoriality and Geographic Limitations
Copyright law, though in many ways harmonized through international
treaty, remains a highly territorial regime.87 It is this territoriality, from both
legal and licensing perspectives, which makes geolocation a useful tool for
website operators. The license obtained by the website operator to make
content available for streaming online may well be restricted to a certain
country or countries by the copyright holder." One entity might hold the
copyright in all the countries in question for a variety of reasons, including
financial constraints, copyright holder preferences, or a desire to control
price or release date in different geographic regions.89 In certain situations,
exclusivity agreements with distributors may limit licensing availability. Yet
in other scenarios, the copyright holder may differ in various countries and
the rights-holders in some countries may be unreachable or unwilling to
agree to a streaming license."1
Though different in a number of ways, the online streaming context
shares some similarities with the controversy over region-coded DVDs.9'
Both region encoding and geographically restricted streaming use the (pre-
sumed) location of the viewer to limit access to the copyrighted work and
raise concerns under § 1201 of the DMCA, which provides the anticircum-
vention rules. 92 The two contexts are perhaps the most similar when a user
has paid for access to a stream but cannot view it because of their location.
Even the grounds typically cited for the two sets of restrictions reflect a high
degree of similarity: DVD region encoding is generally attributed to stag-
gered release dates, price discrimination, distribution and licensing agree-
ments, and regulatory standards or censorship issues.93 Professor Peter Yu
86. Id.
87. See Peter K. Yu, Region Codes and the Territorial Mess, 30 CARDOzo ARTs & ENr.
L.J. 187, 188 (2012).
88. See Trimble, supra note 15, at 611.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. DVDs often include a form of digital rights management which divides the world in
to six regions. A DVD with region I (consisting of the U.S. and Canada), for example, is
playable only on DVD players capable of reading the region I encoding. This means that
someone in the U.K. is unlikely to be able to play such a DVD. Because the region encoding
system divides the playability of the content geographically, it is similar to the geographic
limits imposed by geolocation tools.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2011).
93. See Yu, supra note 87, at 199-216 (describing the justifications for or benefits of
region encoding).
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states that only staggered release actually justifies encoding,94 a theory
which may not apply as cleanly to online streaming. While censorship and
price discrimination may raise concerns in both contexts,95 licensing agree-
ments are likely to be of much greater concern where no physical copy is
sold to the viewer. This is partially due to the fact that the sale of a physical
copy clearly triggers the first-sale doctrine with regards to the copy sold
while the lack of sale of a copy inherent in the digital streaming context does
not.96 As a result, the argument for limiting access to a stream geographi-
cally is somewhat stronger than the arguments advanced for region encoding
of DVDs. Internet geolocation tools, at least to the extent that they are relia-
ble, are also less arbitrary than the current DVD regions. It is possible to
allow or block single countries (or potentially even narrower geographic
units) from access using many of the available tools. In this manner, for
example, Hong Kong may be treated as part of China by a geolocation tool,
whereas DVD regions would mean a disc playable in a Hong Kong DVD
player was not playable in China and vice versa.97
B. DMCA § 1201: The Ban on Circumvention of Access Controls
and Trafficking in Circumvention Tools
Copyright holders have specific rights in their works. These rights in-
clude the right of reproduction, the right to prepare derivative works, and the
right to distribute copies or phonorecords of the work.98 In addition, the
holders of copyrights in certain categories of works have the right of public
performance (in the case of sound recordings, the right of public perform-
ance by digital audio transmission) and the right of public display.99 Along
with these rights, § 1201 prevents circumvention of access or copy controls
placed on the copyrighted work. oo Passed as part of the DMCA in 1998, the
anticircumvention rules in particular were intended to bring U.S. law in line
with treaty obligations under the World Intellectual Property Organization
94. Id. at 216 ("Out of the four justifications advanced in this Part, only sequential
release provides a convincing justification for DVD region codes. It is therefore no surprise
that DVD CCA includes only the first justification in its explanation of the need for region
codes.").
95. Specifically, censorship is likely to raise First Amendment concerns in the U.S. and
price discrimination is of concern under antitrust laws.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2011); 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2011) ("Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of section 106 (3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.").
97. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 87, at 234 (noting that Hong Kong, now a part of China, is
region 3 while China is region 6).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 1201.
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("WIPO") Treaty."" Section 1201(a) of the DMCA bans the act of circum-
venting any measure that "effectively controls access to a work protected
under [the] title" as well as the trafficking in devices for this purpose.10 2 It is
these provisions that could be violated whenever a user evading Internet
geolocation in any of its forms accesses otherwise inaccessible copyrighted
content on the Internet. In addition, liability potentially exists for the parties
who created the tools" 3 used by these end users under the trafficking portion
of the provisions. This Note focuses primarily on whether a user in the U.S.
runs afoul of the restrictions in § 1201 when using a proxy or other geoloca-
tion evasion method to access an otherwise lawful but geographically re-
stricted stream. If the answer is affirmative, it is also necessary to determine
whether there are any limitations on the applicability of § 1201 in this
context, and additionally, whether the developers and providers of evasion
tools may be held liable as traffickers of circumvention devices under
§ 1201(a)(2).
1. Exceptions to § 1201(a) Liability
It is important to note that even if courts read § 1201 strictly, exemp-
tions do exist that allow certain acts of circumvention." None of the spe-
cific exceptions provided cover the evasion of geolocation online unless the
data collected to establish the location of the user can be defined as person-
ally identifying information ("PII")." 5 Subsection (i) provides in part that:
(1) Circumvention permitted. Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsection (a)(1)(A), it is not a violation of that subsection for a
person to circumvent a technological measure that effectively con-
trols access to a work protected under this title, if-
(A) the technological measure, or the work it protects, contains
the capability of collecting or disseminating personally identifying
information reflecting the online activities of a natural person who
seeks to gain access to the work protected[.]
Thus, if the geolocation data-particularly when paired with other data col-
lected by the website operator about the user-can be viewed as PII, then
101. See Lev Ginsburg, Anti-Circumvention Rules and Fair Use, 2002 UCLA J.L. &
TiCH. 4.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2011); see also Eddan Elizafon Katz, Anticircumvention Pro-
visions: RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. & Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,
16 BERKIEIY TE-CH. L.J. 53, 53 (2001); Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of
the Internet, 44 B.C. L. Ruv. 433, 471-72 (2003).
103. For example, if 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2) creates liability for manufacturers and prov-
iders of geolocation evasion tools, the Tor Project would be illegal under the Copyright Act.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2011) (establishing specific exceptions for certain situations or
groups, such as reverse engineering or law enforcement, and also establishing the power of the
Librarian of Congress to make exceptions to § 1201(a)).
105. Id. § 1201(i).
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the act of circumventing geolocation is not in violation of § 1201(a). For
example, if the website operator is able to pair the IP address with consistent
site activity or information provided by the user in the creation of an ac-
count, it is quite possible that the website operator can individually identify
that user in their visits. If this is the case, then the user's desire to prevent
this identification would likely fall under § 1201(i).
In addition to the statutorily defined exemptions, it is possible for the
Librarian of Congress to create an exception that lasts for three years for a
particular type of circumvention.1 o6 The most recent Librarian of Con-
gress-made exceptions were codified in the Federal Register on October 26,
2012.107 Yet none of these currently established exceptions apply to the eva-
sion of geolocation; most exceptions, though not all, relate to accessibility in
the case of disability or to interoperability. 0 These exceptions, described as
a "fail-safe," are intended to offset negative effects in the marketplace from
the requirements of § 1201.19 During the proceeding to establish the three-
year exceptions, the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress
are supposed "to assess whether the implementation of access control mea-
sures is diminishing the ability of individuals to use copyrighted works in
ways that are not infringing and to designate any classes of works with re-
spect to which users have been adversely affected in their ability to make
such noninfringing uses." 0 Even when a class of works has been granted an
exception under a previous rulemaking, there is no assumption that such an
exception should be renewed."' It is up to the group proposing an exception
to convince the Register and Librarian that the exception is warranted."12 In
addition, there must be a showing of harm by the law to the alleged non-
infringing use in order for an exception to be granted."' In the latest
rulemaking, five exceptions were granted and four other exceptions were
considered but denied.1 4 The currently excepted classes include: literary
works distributed electronically for the purpose of assistive technologies;
wireless telephone headsets for the purpose of software interoperability;
106. Id. § 1201(a)(C).
107. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access and Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65260 (Oct. 26, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
part 201), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2012/77fr65260.pdf.
108. Id.
109. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: FIFTH TRIENNIAL PROCEED-
ING To DTIERMIN EXEMIIIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION, RECOMMENDATION
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, at 4 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
1201/2012/Section_%201201_%2ORulemaking%20.2012_%20Recommendation.pdf.
110. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access and Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65261 (Oct. 26, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
part 201), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2012/77fr65260.pdf.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 65262-77.
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wireless telephone headsets for the purpose of interoperability with alterna-
tive networks; motion picture excerpts for the purpose of commentary, criti-
cism, and educational uses; and motion pictures and other audiovisual works
for the purpose of captioning and descriptive audio."' One of those excep-
tions, the one in place for wireless telephone headsets for interoperability
with alternative networks, is an extremely limited exception which only ap-
plies to "handset[s] originally acquired from the operator of a wireless tele-
communications network or retailer no later than ninety days after the
effective date of this exemption.""'6 None of these current exceptions resem-
ble the issue of evasion of geolocation. It seems unlikely that such an excep-
tion would be forthcoming from the next rulemaking (presumably in 2015)
in this context. Although it is possible that privacy or free speech advocates
might lobby for the freedom to circumvent geolocation, such an exception
appears to sweep more broadly than the Librarian has previously allowed.
If no Librarian of Congress exceptions are forthcoming and the PII ex-
ception in subsection (i) does not apply, then it remains possible that users of
geolocation tools who access geographically restricted streams are acting in
violation of § 1201(a). As discussed in Part 1II.B, this is particularly troub-
ling for users who may not realize that such behavior is prohibited in the
statute or who are using the evasion tools primarily for a purpose other than
accessing these streams, such as for greater privacy or to access a remote
machine. If a user often accesses the Internet via proxy, for example, they
may not even realize that by using their ordinary IP address they would be
unable to view specific streaming content." 7
2. Trafficking in Circumvention Devices
Section 1201 (a)(2) of the DMCA provides that "[n]o person shall manu-
facture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any tech-
nology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof' which allows
the user to circumvent an access control."' This subsection explains that
where the device trafficked in and used for circumvention "(A) is primarily
designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing . . . or (B) has only
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent ...
or (C) is marketed . . . for use in circumventing a technological measure that
115. Id. at 65262-71.
116. Id. at 65264.
117. In a conversation with friends living in Canada, for example, I discovered that until
very recently Star Trek: The Next Generation ("Star Trek") was not available on Netflix in
Canada. If I were visiting Canada and, using remote access tools, logged onto Netflix through
a U.S. computer and watched an episode of the show, that could amount to an entirely un-
knowing and unintended violation of § 1201(a). This could be the case even if I were using the
remote access for reasons entirely unrelated to viewing Star Trek in Canada and was entirely
unaware that I could not have watched Star Trek from a computer located in Canada.
118. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2011).
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effectively controls access to a work protected under this title," then the sale
or other provision of that device is prohibited."' 9
As discussed above, however, geolocation evasion tools have many
uses. It is unlikely, for example, that military groups or law enforcement
make use of the Tor Project simply to access copyrighted materials that they
could not otherwise access.12 0 The same can be said for most other evasion
technologies. Remote access and long distance dialup have been in use for
longer than geographically limited video streams have been available online.
As a result, it seems likely that-short of a particular marketing scenario-
the developers or providers of such devices should remain free from
liability.
3. The Ninth Circuit Approach
In MDYIndus. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found it
significant that § 1201(a) does not "explicitly refer[ ] to traditional copyright
infringement under § 106" while the text of § 1201(b) does.121 The Ninth
Circuit there held that "while §1201(b) of the Copyright Act is bound to an
act of copyright infringement, §1201(a) creates liability for circumvention
per se." 22 Under this interpretation, any act of circumvention of an access
control-even one that results in no infringement on any of the rights of the
copyright holder-is in violation of § 1201(a). Further, this interpretation
does not subject this new right to limiting doctrines such as fair use.123
As a result, the court read the statute "as extending a new form of pro-
tection, i.e., the right to prevent circumvention of access controls, broadly to
works protected under Title 17, i.e., copyrighted works." 24 MDY Indus.
dealt with a situation where there did not appear to be any violation of the
traditional rights of the copyright holder; specifically, it involved a bot de-
veloped for cheating on World of Warcraft ("WoW") that avoided detection
by the game's systems.125 In fact, in discussing the bot (called Gilder), the
119. Id.
120. Users of Tor, TOR PROmer, https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.htmi.en (last
visited Dec. 30, 2012).
121. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 945 (9th Cir. 2010).
122. Trimble, supra note 15, at 618; see also MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 928; Universal
City Studios v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d 294, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
123. Trimble, supra note 15, at 618-19 ("The Ninth Circuit's interpretation therefore
recognizes section 1201(a) as creating a new 'right to permit access to copyrighted work,' a
right that is not among the exclusive rights that copyright holders traditionally enjoy and that is
not-as opposed to the exclusive rights enumerated in section 106 of the Copyright Act-
subject to the fair use doctrine."). 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides for fair use exceptions to the rights
of the copyright holder found in 17 U.S.C. § 106. If a use is found to be a fair use, it is
considered to be non-infringing. The statute directs courts to consider "the purpose and charac-
ter of the use . . . the nature of the copyrighted work . . . the amount and substantiality of the
portion used and . .. the effect of the use on the potential market."
124. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 945.
125. Id. at 935-36.
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court noted that "Gilder does not alter or copy WoW's game client software,
does not allow a player to avoid paying monthly subscription dues to Bliz-
zard, and has no commercial use independent of WoW." 26 Even if the
court's findings as to the meaning of § 1201(a) were unclear-which they
are not-the outcome of the case essentially means that no relationship be-
tween a violation of a traditional copyright right and the act of circumven-
tion is necessary to find a violation of the subsection.
Decided prior to MDY Indus., Universal Studios v. Reimerdes is an an-
ticircumvention case from the Southern District of New York. The
Reimerdes court adopted the same approach that would later be followed by
the Ninth Circuit.'27 The case concerned the distribution of DeCSS, a pro-
gram which allowed users to circumvent access restrictions on a DVD and to
play that DVD on a non-licensed player.128 In substance, the conclusion in
Reimerdes is the same as that in MDY Indus.129 Yet Reimerdes provides ad-
ditional insight into an important question when considering evasion of ge-
olocation. Specifically, the court deals with the question of how "effective"
the access control must actually be.' 3" The court, in analyzing the legislative
history, finds that "a technological measure 'effectively controls access' to a
copyrighted work if its function is to control access."'"' This is significant
because, as discussed in Part I, no geolocation tool is perfect. Under the
approach in this case, however, a geolocation tool clearly "effectively" pre-
vents access.
It is evident then that, under the approach espoused by the Ninth Circuit
and by at least one District Court in the Second Circuit, evasion of geoloca-
tion in order to access otherwise lawful streaming content is a violation of
§ 1201(a).' 3 2 As a result, unless an exception applies, such evasion would be
considered unlawful under any circumstances, should this interpretation pre-
vail. It is worth noting that both of these cases deal with the trafficking
provisions of § 1201(a)(2) and not the actual anticircumvention provi-
sions.' But, for the purposes of determining whether traditional infringe-
ment is necessary, the question remains the same in both cases. In each
instance, § 1201(a) is a matter of strict liability.
126. Id. at 935.
127. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 294.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 317-18.
131. Id. at 318.
132. See Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 945 (9th Cir. 2010);
Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 294.
133. Id.
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4. The Federal Circuit Approach
Another core case on the anticircumvention rules-Chamberlain Group,
Inc. v. Skylink Tech, Inc., from the Federal Circuit-concerns the manufac-
ture of garage door openers.134 Chamberlain manufactured garage door
openers that used copyrighted "rolling code" which constantly changed the
signal needed to open the door.13 5 Skylink manufactured substitute remote
controls for the garage doors that did not incorporate this rolling code.'3 6 As
in the previous cases, Chamberlain Group, Inc. deals with trafficking liabil-
ity under § 1201(a)(2).'3 7 Yet the Federal Circuit disagrees with the Ninth
Circuit on the question of per se liability for circumvention.'s They note that
"[w]ere § 1201(a) to allow copyright owners to block all access to their
copyrighted works, it would effectively create two distinct copyright re-
gimes."' 39 This would be a drastic change from the prior law.140 In addition,
they note that "[s]uch a regime would be hard to reconcile with the DMCA's
statutory prescription that nothing in this section shall affect rights, reme-
dies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title. A provision that prohibited access without regard to the rest
of the Copyright Act would clearly affect rights and limitations, if not reme-
dies and defenses."'41 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit finds that "§ 1201 pro-
hibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the
protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners. "142
As a result, the conclusion of the Federal Circuit is quite different from that
of the Ninth Circuit. While the Ninth Circuit approach renders any act of
circumvention of access controls a violation of § 1201, the Federal Circuit
requires at least some nexus between that circumvention and the underlying
copyrighted work.
5. The WIPO Treaty and European Law
Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty requires that "Contracting Par-
ties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used
by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or
the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which
134. The Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
135. Id. at 1183.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1178.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1199.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1200 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Id. at 1202.
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are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law." 43 Under
the language of the treaty, then, the concern is not purely whether access
controls are circumvented, but whether the anticircumvention tool (here ge-
olocation) is used to prevent acts "which are not authorized by the authors
concerned or permitted by law."'" Of course, this raises the question of
what the reach of "authorized by the author" is in the geolocation context.145
But Article 11 does not facially require that all contracting parties make any
act of circumvention of access controls a violation of the copyright laws.
The anticircumvention measures of the DMCA, as well as those measures
implemented in European law, were intended to give effect to these treaty
obligations. 146
The Federal Circuit approach to the DMCA, discussed in Part II.B.4, is
similar to the approach taken in Europe in implementing the WIPO Trea-
ties.'47 As implemented in the 2001 EU Information Society Directive, Euro-
pean law "requirefs] that circumvention of technological measures be
associated with a committed or potential unauthorized or illegal act." 48 Spe-
cifically, the Directive provides that member states should "allow
rightholders to make use of technological measures designed to prevent or
restrict acts not authorised by the rightholders of any copyright, rights re-
lated to copyright or the sui generis right in databases." 49 Under the U.K.
implementation of the Directive, there is no liability for an act of circumven-
tion of access controls unless that act of circumvention facilitates an act of
copyright infringement.'" It is possible to classify the act of accessing a
stream from a location outside of the authorized geographic region as "unau-
thorized," but the stream itself is authorized by the copyright holder, as is the
act of viewing it. European law provides for a more flexible approach to
anticircumvention than that taken by the Ninth Circuit (or S.D.N.Y.) in the
U.S. and potentially even that which is available under the Federal Circuit
approach. Even though European law does not aid in interpreting U.S. law, it
is a helpful indicator of what other parts of the world view as reasonable
with regard to the question of circumvention.
143. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. I1, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 1.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty].
144. Id.; see Trimble, supra note 15, at 612-13.
145. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 143.
146. See Trimble, supra note 15, at 612-15.
147. See id. at 613-14 (discussing European implementation of the WIPO treaties and
the EU Information Society Directive).
148. Id. at 614.
149. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 47, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 19 (EC.
150. See Trimble, supra note 15, at 614-15.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LIABILITY IN THE GEOLOCATION CONTEXT
A user who simply views otherwise legally available streaming video is
not downloading a permanent copy of the video."' It would be somewhat
absurd for the copyright holder to argue that any temporary copy created in
order for the stream to play on the end user's computer is a violation of their
copyright since the same copy would be created by any viewer, even one
who is not evading geolocation. Barring a situation where the user plays the
stream in public and thus violates the copyright holder's public performance
right, the user is not engaging in any of the practices that we traditionally
think of as copyright violations."S2 What they are doing is lying about their
location. Although this may facilitate access to otherwise inaccessible mater-
ials, it is not a question that copyright law should address.
Despite the existence of both rational business reasons for market seg-
mentation and scenarios in which licenses may require that a licensee must
at least attempt to limit from which locations a stream is accessed, there
should not be copyright liability for a user simply viewing the stream from
outside of the desired geographic area. A combination of privacy concerns
(discussed further in Part III.A) and concerns over potentially innocent in-
fringement (discussed in Part III.B) make limiting the potential for liability a
better approach. Most importantly, geolocation data can and should be con-
sidered P11 under § 1201(i), allowing users to circumvent the collection of
said data. Further, even if this data is somehow collected in a manner that
does not render it PII, the European approach (and similar Federal Circuit
approach) is far preferable to that taken by the Ninth Circuit.
A. Geolocation Data Should Be Considered PII
As of now, federal law does not address the use of geolocation.153 How-
ever, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has traditionally defined P11 as
"information that can be linked to a specific individual including, but not
limited to, name, postal address, email address, Social Security number, or
driver's license number."1 54 Level of precision is therefore important. A ge-
olocation tool that could only locate within a city block, for example, would
not result in data detailed enough to be considered P11. Some geolocation
151. It is certainly technologically feasible for someone to access streaming content and
simultaneously download a permanent copy to their computer, but that is outside the scope of
this Note. Such actions would almost certainly result in a copyright violation without turning
to § 1201.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2011).
153. Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Perva-
sive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 61,
115 (2011).
154. FED. TRADE. COMM'N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING: TRACKING, TARGETING, AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 20 n.47 (2009), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/PO85400behavadreport.pdf.
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tools therefore do not result in the collection of PI. Where geolocation tools
do collect PII, however, evasion of geolocation is clearly not in violation of
§ 1201(a) as discussed in Part II.B.l. The fact that some geolocation tools do
not collect data precise enough to be considered PII does not mean that they
all lack this precision. More importantly, most sites collect a variety of infor-
mation about visitors, not simply their location. Once aggregated, this data
may well be sufficient to identify an individual. In the area of behavioral
advertising, consumer and privacy groups have pushed to extend the applica-
tion of FTC principles-usually applied only to PII-to information such as
IP addresses.' The FTC noted that there are a variety of situations in which
IP addresses coupled with other data may be able to identify a specific per-
son, and thus-at least for the purpose of self-regulatory principles-IP ad-
dresses should be considered similarly to traditional P11. 56
If the FTC treats IP addresses similarly in some instances to PII, does
that mean those addresses should fall under the legal definition of PII? At
least in some cases, the data is sufficient to identify a single user.' 7 In fact,
if a user's device has a GPS chip, the location data can be extremely pre-
cise.'" Although few websites currently access GPS data, as GPS-enabled
phones and tablets become more popular, this method seems likely to be-
come more commonplace than the IP geolocation discussed in Part I.C. This
form of geolocation almost certainly collects P11. IP geolocation is a step
removed, certainly, but can still be extremely precise and the greater the
level of precision, the more likely it is for the information to constitute P11. It
has been argued that IP addresses constitute personal data under European
Community ("EC") law.'5 9 Much like the concept embodied in PII, EC law
is concerned with the probability of identification. 6') As the accuracy of the
geolocation method used goes up, so too does the likelihood that EC law
would view its collection and use with concern.' 6' Similarly, IP addresses
may fall under the definition of "personal information" in the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA").162 Both telephone num-
bers and email addresses are listed as "personal information" under COPPA
155. Id. at 21 ("[A] number of consumer and privacy groups expressed support for apply-
ing the Principles to data typically considered to be non-Pll. Specifically, these commenters
would apply the Principles to such data as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, cookie data, and
other information that the commenters stated could allow a set of behaviors or actions to be
associated with a particular individual or computer user, even if that individual is never identi-
fied by name.").
156. Id. at 21-26.
157. See King, supra note 153, at 119-22.
158. Id. at 121.
159. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of Placing
Borders on the "Borderless" Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INIFo. L. 101, 135
(2004).
160. Id. at 135-36.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 136; see 15 U.S.C. § 6501.
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and the Act also provides for determination of other such identifiers. Simi-
larly to IP addresses, email addresses and phone numbers are likely to be
used by multiple individuals, so it is reasonable to believe that IP addresses
may be included.' 63
Websites that use geolocation tools may well collect more than just the
user's location. Further, location alone is a significant piece of identifying
information. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, users will not know the
level of precision in any given site's geolocation technology or what other
information that site has to connect to the location data and use to identify
them. It has been suggested that in the criminal context, the sort of geoloca-
tion data provided by GPS-which is not drastically different from that pro-
vided through the more accurate means of IP geolocation, such as DNS
LOC-may in fact represent a cognizable constitutional ill.1" Though pri-
vate use of such data would not present the same constitutional concern, it is
worrying because the constitutional concern centers around the identifying
nature of the data. As a result, geolocation data should be considered PII and
thus geolocation technologies should be subject to the exception found in
§ 1201(i). With circumvention of these tools now allowed under the excep-
tion, users can utilize geolocation evasion tools to access streaming content
despite geographic restrictions imposed by the website operators unless the
website operators meet the notification requirements in the exception. Be-
cause website operators can avoid falling within the exception through pro-
viding proper notification, allowing it to apply causes at most minimal
inconvenience to the website operators.
B. Even in Cases Where the § 1201(i) Exception Does Not Apply, U.S.
Courts Should Adopt an Approach Similar to the European
or Federal Circuit Approach
European law and the reading of § 1201(a) by the Federal Circuit both
generally require some form of connection between the circumvention of
access and the violation of a traditional copyright right. The European ap-
proach to anticircumvention is more flexible than the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach, and potentially more so than the Federal Circuit approach.'65 While
163. 15 U.S.C. § 6501.
164. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Rea-
sonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 167-68 (2012) ("Echoing the conclusions hinted at by the his-
tory of surveillance, its coercive utility, and the rapid innovation in contemporary surveillance
technology, including geolocation systems, Seventh Circuit Judge Flaum, while criticizing the
reasoning of Maynard in Cuevas-Perez, suggests that the fact of the 'government's gaze' itself,
as exerted by 'mass use of GPS technology,' may represent a 'constitutional ill' which
amounts to a cognizable harm.").
165. Markus Fallenbock, On the Technical Protection of Copyright: The Digital Mil-
lenium Copyright Act, the European Community Copyright Directive and Their Anti-Circum-
vention Provisions, INT'L J. Comm. L. & Po'Y, Winter 2002/2003, at 4, 38.
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facially § 1201 reads as having no knowledge requirement, the European
approach does have a knowledge requirement for the liable party.166 Though
not entirely settled, it is also significantly easier to read in the requirement of
a connection between infringement and circumvention in the European
approach. 167
The more flexible European approach is more reasonable. Some flexi-
bility is needed when applying a complex legal scheme to users who may
only have the most rudimentary understanding of that scheme. The anticir-
cumvention rules are far removed from what the common citizen would
think of as covered under the copyright laws and therefore have the ability to
create ridiculous results when applied too strictly. Access for "unauthorized"
uses would still be restricted under the WIPO treaty.168 But if a use is not
otherwise illegal, then the user should be made aware that their access is not
allowed because of the wishes of the copyright holder. This would protect
innocent infringers.
The Federal Circuit noted that having no connection between "action"
and "protection" in the context of § 1201(a) "would lead to a result so bi-
zarre that Congress could not have intended it."l69 Though they were talking
about garage door openers and computer code, the same logic applies in
online streaming. The copyright holder or licensee has made the content
available, whether for free or for fee, and a consumer wishes to view it. A
savvy consumer knows that peer-to-peer or other download options are
probably illegal. Those who want to pay or at least have their view counted
by the content creator may decide to access the content in what seems like a
reasonable and legal manner. Here, that manner consists of watching the
stream that has been made available to at least some part of world and pay-
ing the fee, if any, that the copyright holder or licensee collects. The viewer
in this case is hardly a pirate depriving the copyright holder of the reward for
their creativity. At worst, they are lying and preventing the copyright holder
from engaging in market segmentation.
C. What Can Copyright Holders and Licensees Do?
In many cases, copyright holders and licensees should not be overly
concerned. Not all users will be able or motivated to evade geolocation to
access region-locked material online. Some viewers will successfully access
the stream from an unauthorized location, but if the stream requires pay-for-
view then the website operator will still collect payment for the consumer's
enjoyment of the content. If the stream is free, there may be more cause for
166. Id. at 39.
167. Id. at 40-42 (discussing Article 6 of the Directive and the readings by the Council
and Commission).
168. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 143.
169. The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
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concern, though the consumer is still increasing the number of views and
watching any advertising content displayed with the stream. Nevertheless,
there are some approaches for those who are particularly concerned with
these situations.
First, § 1201(i) only operates where the website operator has not noti-
fied the visitor of the data's collection. 70 Use of such a notice is beneficial
to the website operator who wants to restrict access, but also to the website
visitor who may not realize that their access is problematic. Most online user
agreements can either be considered "clickwrap" or "browsewrap" because
they come in standard form without negotiation, much like a traditional
shrinkwrap agreement.' 7 ' Clickwrap agreements require users to actually
click to show their acceptance of terms, while browsewrap agreements make
further browsing the act of acceptance. 72 Clickwrap agreements have been
held more consistently enforceable than browsewrap because the act of as-
sent by the user is arguably clearer. 73 Potentially, the notice could be as
simple as a pop-up window notifying the user that the site is collecting loca-
tion data to meet copyright licensing requirements and asking the user to
acknowledge that their location is, to the best of their knowledge, accurately
presented. It could also be included in a standard End User License Agree-
ment in the case of sites such as Netflix, where some form of contractual
privity already exists. If the terms are reasonably provided to the user, then
there is some duty in the user to read them and abide by them.174 At least in
this context, the consumer who is not evading geolocation purely for access
to the specific stream now has some constructive knowledge that their point
of access is being collected and thus may be relevant. Ideally, this notifica-
tion or agreement would also describe the reason for which the information
is being collected, notifying users that if they disguise their location from the
website, their access is unauthorized, putting it more clearly within the reach
of the WIPO treaty. Without this information, the user may potentially be
innocently achieving this unauthorized access, unaware that what they are
doing is wrong. Subsection (i) also only applies to the act of circumvention,
not the trafficking provisions. 75 This is less relevant in this particular con-
text, however, since current geolocation evasion tools have uses other than
circumventing access restrictions to copyrighted works.
170. See id. at 29.
171. Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 Am. U. L. REv. 1635, 1642
(2011).
172. Id.
173. Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and
Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. Sca. & TECH. 79, 96-97 (2008) (discussing
the enforceability of contract types and noting that some website operators may still choose
browsewrap despite the enforceability risks because of concerns over decrease in traffic when
using clickwrap).
174. Hartzog, supra note 171, at 1643-44.
175. Id.
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Second, user agreements can serve a similar purpose as notification to
indicate the collection of location data, at least from the perspective of the
website operator. If a user must agree that they are accessing the stream
from within the defined geographic area, then viewers who are not liable
under § 1201(a) are still in breach of the contract created by the user
agreement.
CONCLUSION
Technologically, there is no way to completely prevent evasion of ge-
olocation, and the copyright laws are not the proper place for the handling of
such issues. Evasion of geolocation serves a range of purposes and as a
result, legal limitations should be carefully considered before being put in
place. One of the key purposes served is protection of privacy, which is also
one of the key reasons that evasion of geolocation should not be considered
a violation of § 1201(a). As discussed in Part III.A, as the accuracy of geolo-
cation tools improve, protection of IP addresses helps to prevent precise
identification of users, preserving some level of anonymity. Though ano-
nymity is not always necessary, there remain situations in which higher
levels of privacy serve a valid end. For example, journalists may wish to
keep their identity secret when speaking with whistleblowers online, while
governments may want to preserve privacy in information gathering.'7 6 In
2009, the Electronic Frontier Foundation encouraged readers to set up Tor
bridges or Tor relays to aid Internet users in Iran in circumventing govern-
ment censorship and to preserve anonymity during the events following the
disputed Iranian election.1'7 Still other users may wish to avoid "Internet
filtering" established by their governments to prevent supposedly harmful
information from reaching their citizens.17 8 The paradigmatic example of
this is perhaps the "Great Firewall of China," but Australia, the EU, and the
U.S. have at times proposed legislation that would work similar, though less
restrictive limitations on access.'79 If evasion of geolocation wherever copy-
176. Tor Overview, TOR PRoJECr, https://www.torproject.org/aboutloverview.htm.en
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
177. Help Protestors in Iran: Run a Tor Bridge or a Tor Relay, ELECRONic FRoNTII;R
FOUNDATION (June 29, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/06/help-protesters-iran-run-
tor-relays-bridges.
178. Joanna Kulesza, Walled Gardens of Privacy or "Binding Corporate Rules?": A
Critical Look at International Protection of Online Privacy, 34 U. ARK. LITrILE ROCK L. Reiv.
747, 761-62 (2012).
179. Id. at 762 ("Apparently encouraged by China's success in delimiting the 'Chinese
cyberspace' with the Great Firewall of China, the EU considered the electronic Schengen zone
in 2011, the very same year Australia introduced plans to block illegal content away from its
'virtual territory.' Just recently the U.S. considered closing 'U.S. cyberspace' to prevent copy-
right violations with the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA).
The U.S. is still considering securing 'the U.S. cyberspace,' as if raising national borders in
cyberspace was a natural consequence of state sovereignty.").
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righted content is blocked by geolocation tools is a violation of § 1201(a),
then even users who practice evasion for these potentially laudible goals will
find themselves running afoul of the statute.
There are valid reasons for a copyright holder or licensee to want to
limit content streaming geographically and facilitation of this practice
through geolocation is a logical step. What is not a logical step is turning
what would otherwise be authorized access into a violation of § 1201 simply
because the user, for any one of a number of reasons, has chosen to disguise
their true location. Those users who knowingly obscure their IP addresses
purely to gain access to content they know is restricted by location may
indeed run afoul of § 1201(a), but not all users who evade geolocation are
doing so for this reason. A user may access a remote machine for work or be
attempting to avoid the restrictions of a repressive regime; in these cases,
and others like them, the goals of § 1201(a) are not served by imposing
liability. Section 1201(i) provides that where the information collected as
part of the control of access is considered P11, the user circumventing the
tool is not liable unless the content provider notifies the user of this data's
collection. Because IP addresses provide significant data as to the location
and potential identity of users, they should be considered PII for this pur-
pose. In addition, § 1201 was passed to bring the U.S. into compliance with
its treaty obligations. Other parties to the WIPO Treaty, such as the EU,
have not taken the approach embraced by the Ninth Circuit. The approaches
taken in the EU and by the Federal Circuit in the U.S. would generally not
create liability for geolocation evasion and these are the approaches that
should be followed.
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